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PT Cipta Perdana Lancar Tbk

PT Cipta Perdana Lancar is a founder-controlled Indonesian metal-stamping manufacturer supplying vehicle, electronics and household components from one Tangerang factory — profitable and fast-growing, but small, bank-funded, and thin on cash.

Two years after its Rp105 listing, the shares round-tripped — up to a Rp214 close in February 2026, down to a Rp67 close in June, and back near Rp106 — a path driven more by a thin float than by the business.
Rp106
Share price
Rp291B
Market value
Rp370B
FY2025 revenue
74.4%
Family-owned
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The statements

Five years of statements: revenue nearly tripled, cash nearly vanished

FY2021 → FY2025as reported · Rp
RevenueRp369.6B+38%
Operating margin11.0%−0.7pp
Net incomeRp30.2B+30%
EPSRp11.10+13%
Open the full statements →
As reported, FY2021–FY2025; margins are a contract manufacturer's steady signature.
  • Revenue. Net sales climbed from Rp129bn in FY2021 to Rp369.6bn in FY2025 — up 38% in the latest year alone, and roughly 55% over the last two.
  • Margins. Net margin has held in a 7–9% band for four years and operating margin near 11%; steel cost passes through to price rather than being absorbed.
  • The catch. FY2025 profit reached Rp30.2bn, but only about half turned to cash, and the year-end balance fell to Rp2.9bn from Rp55.2bn a year earlier.
EPS falls across the years on a larger post-IPO share count, not weaker earnings; absolute profit is the honest scorecard.
Where growth came from

Most of FY2025's growth came from a single government order

FY2025 revenue growth, by source (Rp bn)
Of the Rp102bn added in FY2025, 61% came from one new line.
  • One buyer. PART's new metal-household segment (Rp62.1bn, 61% of FY2025 revenue growth) is one government customer, Badan Gizi Nasional, whose FY2025 order matches the segment total to the rupiah and carries no contracted recurrence.
  • What rides on it. That Rp62.1bn is 16.8% of FY2025 revenue, from an account that sold nothing before 2025; on a bear path where it reverts to ~Rp5bn, revenue falls to ~Rp336bn and profit to ~Rp23bn.
  • The other read. Management describes the food-tray business as continuous rather than tender-based, and the kitchen network it supplies is still expanding — a general business-model statement, not a documented commitment that this order repeats.
The core risk

The bear case and the refinancing wall are one event

Rp24.1B
Bank debt due within a year
Rp2.9B
Cash on handcovers 12%
Rp42.2B
Finished goodsno obsolescence reserve
  • One correlated event. The bear case and the refinancing wall are one event: a FY2026 in which the Badan Gizi order does not recur is also the year the Rp42.2bn inventory does not convert, even as ~Rp24.1bn of BCA debt matures against Rp2.9bn of cash.
  • Why they are linked. The same government order drives both the revenue at risk — 16.8% of sales — and the Rp42.2bn of finished goods, about 23% of equity, carried at full cost.
  • The bound. The founder personally guarantees the full BCA facility on family land, and the bank has rolled and expanded the lines before, so the risk is bounded by the controller's own wealth, not net cash.
Cash and solvency

Profit is real, but only about half of it turns to cash

Net profit vs operating cash flow (Rp bn)
Cash conversion fell from 1.6× in FY2023 to 0.51× in FY2025.
  • Half turns to cash. FY2025's Rp30.2bn of profit produced just Rp15.5bn of operating cash — a 0.51× conversion — as inventory doubled to Rp62.2bn, most of it finished goods.
  • Cushion spent. The July 2024 IPO left Rp55.2bn of cash; eighteen months and Rp72bn of capex later, Rp2.9bn remained. Free cash flow has been negative three years running.
  • Reads two ways. The Rp42.2bn finished-goods build is benign if it ships in 2026, a write-down risk if demand softened — the first line to watch in the next audited accounts.
The debt stack

Every rupiah of debt sits with one bank, guaranteed by the founder

BCA facilities and maturities
FacilityPurposeMaturityRate
Local credit (Rp15B)Working capitalJun 20269.25%
Revolver (Rp15B)ReceivablesJun 20269.00%
Investment creditDies & machines2027–20318.0–8.4%
Investment creditLand & buildings2030–20338.0%
Total bank debt Rp123bn — moderate at ~2.0× EBITDA, but from a single lender.
  • One bank. Every facility is with BCA — no second lender, no bond — secured on land, machinery and receivables, and personally guaranteed by founder-CEO Hamim.
  • The near-term wall. Two Rp15bn working-capital lines both mature in June 2026; renewal on similar terms is what keeps the single-lender relationship intact.
  • Termed-out core. The investment credits funding dies, machines and buildings run to 2030–2033 at 8–9%, so the maturity ladder itself is manageable.
Ownership

A genuine founder company — with the control that comes with it

Share ownership
The founding family controls 74.4%; the public float is 25.6%.
  • Skin in the game. The family owns 74.4%, and founder-CEO Hamim personally guarantees every rupiah of BCA debt on family land — the strongest alignment fact in the filings.
  • Restrained take. Board pay is 9.3% of profit with no equity plan, dividends are pro-rata, and pre-IPO affiliate funding has been wound down to near zero.
  • The flip side. A 25.6% float cannot block or outvote anything; a January 2026 meeting authorised the board to pledge substantially all assets. The check is incentives, not structure.
Demand and durability

Fast growth against a flat market — a share-and-diversification story

Revenue by segment (Rp bn)
Indonesia's motorcycle market is flat near 6.4m units; growth came from share and one new line.
  • Flat pool, share gains. Motorcycle sales held near 6.4m units in 2025, barely changed from 2023, yet PART grew revenue ~55% over two years — a share-and-diversification story, not a rising tide.
  • Automotive is still the core. The automotive franchise supplied 80% of FY2025 sales and grew 15%; it sits on a deep replacement-parts pool and is largely insulated from the sub-1% EV transition.
  • The new leg is unproven. Two-thirds of the year's growth came from a household line with no track record, sold into kitchenware and fryer markets where PART has no established position.
Earnings quality

Profit grew on volume, and every margin line thinned

Gross margin by quarter, FY2025
Q4 was 39.5% of the year's revenue at the lowest margin of the four — 16.8%.
  • Volume, not pricing. FY2025 profit rose 30%, but gross margin fell from 21.9% to 19.2% and net from 8.7% to 8.2%. The step-up was volume through near-fixed cost, not better unit economics.
  • Back-loaded. The fourth quarter alone was 39.5% of the year's revenue at the lowest gross margin, 16.8% — the government order landed almost entirely in the second half.
  • A quieter offset. Roughly 23% of pre-tax profit came from recurring scrap sales rather than making parts, and the segment note allocates cost pro-rata, hiding the order's true margin.
Scale vs peer

The nearest listed peer is 16× larger and far more cash-generative

PART vs Dharma Polimetal (DRMA), FY2025
MetricPARTDRMA
Revenue (Rp bn)369.65,940
Net profit (Rp bn)30.2664
Gross margin19.2%18.0%
ROE16.3%20.9%
Cash conversion (CFO/NI)0.51×1.39×
At the stamping operation PART holds its own on margin; the gap opens on cash and scale.
  • Holds its own on margin. PART's 19.2% gross margin edges DRMA's 18.0%, so the small company competes on price and cost at the level of the stamping line itself.
  • The gap is cash. DRMA — itself one of PART's customers — turned Rp664bn of profit into Rp924bn of cash (1.39×) against PART's 0.51×, evidence that PART's cash problem is company-specific.
  • No structural moat. PART is a sub-scale tier supplier of commodity stamped metal; its edge is execution and proximity, not pricing power.
Valuation

Back near its IPO price, but not a discount to its peers

9.6×
Trailing P/Etop of peer range
1.6×
Price / book
5.6×
EV / EBITDA
1.6%
Dividend yieldpeers 7–8%
  • Full, not cheap. At Rp106 the stock trades at 9.6× earnings — above Astra Otoparts (~5.8×) and its closest analog Dharma Polimetal (~7.0×), level with the highest-quality name Selamat Sempurna (~9.0×).
  • Same book, lower return. PART and DRMA both trade at 1.6× book, but DRMA earns 20.9% on that book against PART's 16.3% — paying the same multiple for a lower-returning, cash-shorter business.
  • Thin income. The 1.6% yield sits well below peers at 7–8%, because the cash is committed to working capital and the BCA facility.
Scenarios

At Rp106, cheap only if the government order recurs

FY2026 P/E at Rp106, by scenario
Illustrative, not forecasts: the scenarios differ almost entirely on the household line.
  • Bear. If the fit-out was one-time, revenue falls ~9% to ~Rp336bn and profit to ~Rp23bn, making the same Rp106 a 12.6× multiple on a shrinking base — the opposite of a value entry.
  • Base and bull. Partial recurrence holds revenue near Rp369bn (~10×); a scaling franchise lifts it to ~Rp443bn and ~Rp40bn profit, near 7×, with cash conversion normalising as capex tapers.
  • The pivots. Two FY2026 disclosures decide it: whether Badan Gizi reappears in Note 24, and whether operating cash returns toward 1.0× of profit.
Price

A round-trip from Rp105 to Rp214 and back, on a thin float

Listed at Rp105 in July 2024; back near Rp106 two years on.
  • Volatility, not re-rating. On a 25.6% float the shares ran to a Rp214 close in February 2026 and fell to Rp67 in June before settling near Rp106 — micro-cap price behaviour, not fundamentals.
  • Not automatically cheap. A price back at the IPO level is cheap only if the business is worth more than at listing; here that turns on the order's durability and the balance sheet behind it.
  • No coverage. No sell-side analyst follows PART and there is no published consensus; the forward view has to be built from its own record and capacity.
What to watch

A founder-aligned micro-cap that looks cheap — if one government order recurs and one bank keeps lending

Read the full report →

This distills a guided study of PT Cipta Perdana Lancar, built chapter by chapter from its filings.

Compiled from the full report · 2026-07-19 · For information, not investment advice.